We study how determinacy and learnability of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium may be a¤ected by monetary policy in a simple, two country, New Keynesian framework under both …xed and ‡exible exchange rates. We …nd that open economy considerations may alter conditions for determinacy and learnability relative to closed economy analyses, and that new concerns can arise in the analysis of classic topics such as the desirability of exchange rate targeting and monetary policy cooperation.
Introduction

Overview
New Keynesian macroeconomic models have become a workhorse for studying a variety of monetary policy issues in closed economy environments. An important component of this e¤ort has been the development of the idea that equilibrium determinacy and learnability may be signi…cantly in ‡uenced by monetary policy choices. 1 Recently, simple extensions of the New Keynesian model to open economy environments have been developed. Our primary concern in this paper is to provide an analysis of the extent to which the …ndings concerning determinacy and learnability for the closed economy New Keynesian framework may be altered when open economy considerations are brought to bear. Our learnability criterion is that of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . Our approach to this question is to adopt a simple framework for a twocountry world due to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) . This framework provides one straightforward extension of the New Keynesian model to two countries and allows comparison to the more common single country and small open economy analyses as special cases. We focus on the two polar cases of …xed and ‡exible exchange rates, and ask the question how determinacy and international monetary policy transmission are a¤ected by the exchange rate regime.
Main …ndings
The main …ndings under ‡exible exchange rates are as follows. Instrument rules which are focussed on domestic in ‡ation and domestic output gaps lead to world determinacy and learnability conditions which must be met in each economy independently of whether they are met in the partner economy. For targeting rules, this result has a natural counterpart when policymakers in 1 each country pursue non-cooperative optimal policy under discretion. The choice of how to implement the optimality condition stemming from the minimization problem faced by the monetary authorities can easily be made inappropriately, leading to indeterminacy and expectational instability.
On the other hand, instrument rules which include responses to international economic conditions induce international feedback between the two economies even when there would otherwise be no such feedback. The separability of conditions between countries breaks down. This second result again has a natural counterpart in the case of targeting rules, in the situation where the two countries agree to try to pursue the gains from cooperation which may exist in the model. Implementation will again be an issue.
We also …nd that, if properly implemented, a ‡exible exchange rate regime has attractive insulation properties relative to a …xed exchange rate regime (here modelled as an exchange rate peg).
We conclude that determinacy and learnability considerations can alter the evaluation of monetary policy options in an international context.
Recent related literature
Batini, Levine, Justiniano and Pearlman (2005) study indeterminacy in a two-country New Keynesian model. Their focus is on the relationship between many-period forward-looking in ‡ation forecast rules and indeterminacy conditions. We do not consider rules in this class in this paper. When forward-looking rules are considered here, they arise from the implementation of certain optimality considerations and do not involve forecasts more than one period into the future.
De Fiore and Liu (2005) study indeterminacy in a small open New Keynesian economy. Their model is somewhat di¤erent from the one we study. They conclude that whether a given policy rule can deliver determinacy will depend on the degree of openness in the small economy, a result we also obtain.
A number of papers study classic open economy issues in the New Keynesian framework. Pappa (2004) and Benigno and Benigno (2004) , for exam-ple, study the gains from monetary policy coordination. Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) analyze 'self-oriented'or 'inward-looking'national monetary policies in frameworks related to the one studied here. While touching on some related themes, these papers do not focus on the determinacy and learnability issues we emphasize.
Ellison Bullard and Mitra (2002) . The Llosa and Tuesta (2005) discussion of domestic in ‡ation versus consumer price index in ‡ation in the policy rule parallels some of our analysis, and we compare our results to theirs when appropriate.
Organization
We begin by presenting the basic model environment in the next section. We take up our analysis of the e¤ects of policy on determinacy and learnability by …rst considering instrument rules under ‡exible exchange rates, simple descriptions of policy that allow us to develop some basic results and intuition, especially concerning "country by country" determinacy and learnability conditions. Policymakers using rules in this class might break the natural separability of country analysis in the model should they decide to react in part to international variables when setting monetary policy, and we develop a version of this situation. We then turn to targeting rules (also under ‡exible exchange rates), whereby the policy rule is inferred from an optimization exercise undertaken by each monetary authority. The nature of the optimization exercise will be important for our …ndings. The …nal portion of the paper takes up certain asymmetric situations associated with …xed exchange rates. One of these is the case of one country pegging its exchange rate to a second country which is following an independent monetary policy. We discuss our …ndings and directions for future research in the conclusion.
A two-country New Keynesian model 2.1 Overview
We employ the two-country model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) . This is one natural extension of the closed economy New Keynesian model to the open economy case in which two large economies are interacting, and so it provides a good starting point for the analysis of determinacy issues in the open economy. The model has a natural separation between countries that Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) discuss in some detail. Roughly, after making certain adjustments to parameters accounting for the degree of openness of each economy, this version of the open economy New Keynesian model is qualitatively the same as the standard, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)-style closed economy New Keynesian model. We exploit this feature extensively in this paper.
Environment
We can provide only a brief discussion of the microfoundations of the model here-interested readers should consult Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002).
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The two countries are labelled H and F: Preferences and technologies are the same in both countries. Each country has an intermediate goods sector which is subject to a Calvo-style sticky price friction along with a …nal goods sector which is competitive. Only …nal goods are traded. Preferences for consumption are de…ned over an aggregate C t = C 1 H;t C F;t , with 0 1: The parameter is often described as the degree of openness, because as ! 0 ( ! 1) the foreign (home) economy becomes vanishingly small, and all goods are produced and consumed at home (abroad). The model economy is log-linearized about a steady state and described bỹ
(1)
where
The variableỹ t represents the domestic output gap, t represents domestic producer price in ‡ation, and r t represents the short term nominal interest rate. The term rr t is the domestic natural real interest rate (conditional on foreign output) given by
where y t+1 is the rate of growth of the domestic natural level of output and y ? t+1 is the rate of growth of the level of foreign output. The term u t follows an AR (1) process given by u t = u t 1 + u;t ;with 0 < 1; where u;t is an i:i:d: stochastic term. 3 The equations (1) and (2) have …ve fundamental parameters: The household discount factor ; a parameter controlling the curvature in preferences over consumption ; a parameter controlling the curvature in preferences over leisure ; the mass of agents or degree of openness ; and the probability that a …rm will not be able to change its price today ; which we sometimes refer to as the degree of price stickiness. The foreign economy is described analogously as (3) and (4), the fundamental parameters ; ; ; ; and are all the same as in equations (1) and (2), re ‡ecting the maintained assumption that the preferences and technologies in the two economies are the same. The only di¤erence is that in (1) and (2) has been replaced by 1 in (3) and (4).
The nominal exchange rate e t obeys consumer price index-based, or "aggregate"purchasing power parity, and is given by The special cases where either ! 0 or ! 1 respectively place all the mass of agents in the home or the foreign economy. In these cases, the home or foreign economy behaves as if it were an isolated, closed economy, while the partner behaves as if it were a small open economy. 4 An isolated, closed economy corresponds to the ones that have been extensively analyzed in the New Keynesian literature.
Determinacy issues
As pointed out by Jensen (2002) , since Sargent and Wallace (1975) showed that an interest rate peg rendered the price level indeterminate in a rational expectations IS-LM-AS model, there has been a lot of research in the issue of designing monetary policy in order to secure determinate rational expectations equilibria. The model above is one where an interest rate peg would also lead to indeterminate equilbrium. To understand some of the intuition for this result, consider a sunspot-driven increase in in ‡ation expectations, E t t+1 . As this does not a¤ect the nominal interest rate r t , the real interest rate falls. This stimulates demand and the output gap via equation (1) . Through the interaction of the IS and Phillips curves, this implies an increase in current in ‡ation that is larger than the increase in expected in ‡ation. As the increase in in ‡ation expectations is of arbitrary size, one cannot pin down a unique non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium (REE). The economy is consequently vulnerable to expectations-driven ‡uctuations, a.k.a. sunspot ‡uctuations.
To ensure determinacy and thus exclude the potential for ine¢ cient, selfful…lling ‡uctuations, some restrictions are typically required on the behavior of the nominal interest rate. In the remainder of the paper we will analyze the model under di¤erent scenarios for how these interest rates are determined by policymakers. We will begin with a simple speci…cation that produces simple intuition, and later move to more complicated optimal policy speci…cations under a variety of assumptions on the nature of the optimization policymakers undertake.
3 Flexible exchange rates: instrument rules 3.1 Simple Taylor-type rules
The dynamic system
In this section we simply assume that the policymakers in each country follow Taylor-type policy rules given by
for the domestic economy, and by
for the foreign economy, allowing the exchange rate to ‡oat. Importantly, the in ‡ation terms in these rules refer to domestic producer price in ‡ation (we discuss other possibilities below). By substituting (6) and (7) into equations (1) and (3) 
where and where V t follows a vector AR (1) process with serial correlation given by the scalar :
Determinacy
Because the four variables in this system are free in the terminology of Blanchard and Kahn (1980), we require all eigenvalues of B to be inside the unit circle for determinacy. Since B is block diagonal, this requirement means that the eigenvalues of B 11 and B 22 must be inside the unit circle. From a version of Proposition 1 in Bullard and Mitra (2002) , this implies that the following two conditions must hold for determinacy in this system:
and
These conditions are versions of the Taylor principle 6 for each country and depend on the household discount factor ; on the policy parameters in the Taylor-type rules in the two countries, and on the composite parameters o and
We can write the composite parameters as
Thus the conditions (9) and (10) can be written as
The term in brackets is positive, so that if ' y = ' ? y = 0; the conditions state that each central bank has to move nominal interest rates more than onefor-one in response to deviations of in ‡ation from target. We have several remarks on conditions (11) and (12).
First, the conditions for the two economies are not the same except in the special case where policies are identical (in the sense that ' = '
? and
? y ) and = 1=2; which would be interpreted as the case that the two economies are equally open. 7 Otherwise, the degree of openness di¤ers and this translates into a di¤erence in the two conditions. This means in particular that identical policy in the two countries, in the sense of identical values for the Taylor-type policy rule coe¢ cients, may be enough to meet one determinacy condition but not the other. Second, the policy parameters from a single country can only in ‡uence one of the two conditions. Thus policymakers from each country must separately meet conditions for determinacy: Determinacy conditions for worldwide rational expectations equilibrium are met, in some sense, "country by country."
We interpret these …ndings as follows. If the home country policymaker obeys the Taylor principle while the foreign policymaker does not, worldwide equilibrium will be indeterminate. Should a sunspot variable begin to in ‡u-ence expectations, then the foreign economy will endure endogenous volatility, but the home country will not due to the block diagonality of B which indicates that there is no feedback between the two economies. The intuition is that any international CPI in ‡ation di¤erential will cause the nominal exchange rate to adjust, exactly o¤setting the foreign in ‡ation problem, and exactly insulating the home country. This result relies heavily on the idea that the two Taylor rules react to domestic producer price in ‡ation, which has no imported component, as opposed to consumer price in ‡ation, which does have an imported component. With CPI in ‡ation in the policy rules, or with a …xed exchange rate, this will no longer be the case. We discuss these possibilities below.
Learnability
We now turn to the learnability of rational expectations equilibrium for cases where that equilibrium is unique. We allow the expectations in equation (8) to initially be di¤erent from rational expectations. 8 The MSV solution of equation (8) is given by
where the conformable matrix A is null and
We endow agents with a perceived law of motion
where A and C are conformable. Using this perceived law of motion and assuming time t information (1; rr t ; u t ; rr
Substituting this into equation (8) yields the actual law of motion
We then de…ne a map T from the perceived law of motion to the actual law of motion as T (A; C) = (BA; BC + X ) :
Expectational stability is attained if the di¤erential equation
is locally asymptotically stable at A; C . Results in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) establish that under weak conditions, expectational stability governs stability in the real-time learning dynamics. We use Proposition 10.3 in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) to calculate the condition for expectational stability. According to the proposition, the condition for expectational stability is that the real parts of the eigenvalues of the matrices B and B are less than unity. Because 0 < 1; we need only check the real parts of the eigenvalues of B. Also, because of the block diagonality of B, the expectational stability condition can be calculated country by country, that is, via B 11 and B 22 ; and by a version of Proposition 2 in Bullard and Mitra (2002) yields conditions (11) and (12) . This means that both countries must meet the open economy version of the Taylor principle in order for the world equilibrium to be learnable. It also means that the conditions for determinacy are the same as the conditions for learnability in the special case where both countries follow simple Taylor-type instrument rules. This is known not to be true in general in models in this class with alternative instrument rules, but it provides a good benchmark. 9 
Quantitative e¤ects
As stressed by Gertler (2001, 2002) , the nature of the policy problem faced by each country in this open economy framework is isomorphic to the closed economy case, but there are nevertheless quantitative 9 An example of a case in which determinacy and learnability conditions do not coincide is when the policy authorities use a Taylor-type policy rule but react to lagged information on in ‡ation and the output gap. See Bullard and Mitra (2002) . For a wider variety of Taylor-type instrument rules in a similar model, see Llosa and Tuesta (2005) .
consequences. Figure 1 illustrates. Here the calibration has been chosen so that the domestic economy collapses to the one studied by Woodford (2003) 
The …gure plots (11) as a function of ' and ' y using this calibration for values of between zero and unity. Since (12) 
Instrument rules with international variables
In this section we brie ‡y summarize this argument. We begin by supposing that each country pursues a Taylor-type rule featuring consumer price index, or CPI, in ‡ation instead of domestic producer price in ‡ation.
11 This is intuitively plausible as in an open economy CPI in ‡ation, not domestic producer price in ‡ation, is often the variable of interest for the monetary authority. The monetary policy rule in the home country is given by
and the monetary authority in the foreign economy pursues
is home CPI in ‡ation, and
is foreign CPI in ‡ation, and where s t is the terms of trade. 12 The in ‡ation targets of the monetary authorities implicit in these speci…cations would then 11 This is also the second rule analyzed by Llosa and Tuesta (2005) for their small open economy analysis. 12 In our two-country model following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002, p. 882) the home consumption price index can be written as P C;t = k 1 P 1 H;t P F;t . Using the de…nition of be in terms of CPI in ‡ation. Thus, responding to CPI in ‡ation is equivalent to having a conventional Taylor-type rule augmented by a third term which is the terms of trade. The terms of trade is in turn a re ‡ection of foreign output via equation (5) . The policymakers in each country are naturally reacting to developments in the partner economy because some fraction of the goods being consumed at home are being produced abroad. Thus the policymaker reaction to CPI in ‡ation introduces international feedback between the two countries that does not exist under Taylor-type rules with domestic producer price in ‡ation.
As a consequence the key matrix B is no longer block diagonal (B 12 and B 21 are no longer null). We stress that the loss of the block diagonality of this matrix is induced by policy alone. Policymakers are reacting to consumer rather than producer prices and this is creating international linkages that would otherwise not exist. This means, in principle, that policy parameters in one country will in ‡uence all aspects 13 of worldwide conditions for determinacy and learnability. The separability of these conditions across borders breaks down-in spite of ‡exible exchange rates and PPP-because the policymakers are reacting to variables that have foreign components. In section 5 we consider the case where the home country irrevocably pegs its exchange rate to the foreign currency, which is another rule that responds to international variables and changes the implied form of the key matrix B.
the terms of trade S t = P F;t =P H;t this equation can be written as P C;t = k 1 P H;t S t , where k = (1 )
. For the foreign country one gets P C;t = k 1 (P H;t )
. Taking logs of these equations yields p C;t = p t + s t and p C;t = p t (1 ) s t . Taking …rst di¤erences and normalizing the initial (t 1) price levels to zero, these equations can then be rewritten as the home and foreign CPI in ‡ation equations in the main text. 13 That is, all four eigenvalues.
Flexible exchange rates: targeting rules 4.1 Overview
In this section we assume that the central bank sets policy optimally. This means that the nominal interest rate is set according to a rule inferred from an explicit optimization exercise. 14 We investigate the benchmark case of discretion 15 and consider two implementation strategies of the …rst-order condition along the lines of Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) (hereafter EH). The various implementation strategies may or may not provide determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibrium. In the next sub-section we focus on the non-cooperative case in which each policymaker sets monetary policy autonomously. We will turn to the cooperative case in Section 4.3.
Non-cooperative discretionary policy 4.2.1 The policy problem
Importantly, as Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) mention, the correct in ‡a-tion variable for the policymaker following a non-cooperative discretionary policy is domestic producer price in ‡ation. This means t will enter into the objective for the domestic policymaker. 16 Under discretion the monetary authority will choose a sequence of current and future short-term nominal interest rates to minimize loss de…ned by 2005). 15 For a discussion of determinacy issues for optimal rules in a closed economy where the timing protocol is commitment, see Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b) . 16 The reason is that by targeting a combination of PPI in ‡ation and the domestic output gap (in line with Clarida, Gali and Gertler 2002) -where the weight on the latter, 0 , is not free but given by 0 = = 0 , the policymaker actually mimics targeting CPI in ‡ation -which in turn has its micro foundations in social welfare. 
We can reformulate the problem above as choosing the indirect control variable fỹ g 
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(1 )
where t and E t t+1 are state variables. The …rst order conditions are
From equation (21) we
It is well-known in the closed economy literature that there are a variety of strategies for implementing conditions like (23) , and that these strategies can have di¤ering implications for determinacy and learnability. We now turn to two implementations for the open economy model in order to see how these results may or may not be altered.
An open economy expectations-based optimal rule
Combining the …rst-order condition (23) with equation (19) we obtain
(where rr t is the ex ante real interest rate r t E t t+1 ). This can be written as
Substituting for t from equation (20) we obtain
Eliminating output via (19) yields r t rr t = 0;0 + ;0 E t t+1 + y;0 E tỹt+1 + u;0 u t (24) where the coe¢ cients are given by
Equation (24) is an example of a targeting rule, as discussed for example in Woodford (2003, pp. 290-295 where
Because B is block diagonal, determinacy conditions will be have to be met country by country. A unique rational expectations equilibrium exists since
for the domestic economy, and
for the foreign economy. What we have in this section is di¤erent from section 3.1.2 on determinacy of instrument rules. Although in both cases we have a B-matrix that is block diagonal, under an Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) style expectations-based optimal rule (adhered to in both countries), we have unconditional determinacy of the two-country world economy. There is no possibility of indeterminacy of the 'world equilibrium'like we had in section 3.1.2. So, there is nothing like a Taylor principle that needs to be adhered to.
Next, we turn to the learnability of the rational expectations equilibrium. Because of the block diagonality of B, the expectational stability condition can be calculated country by country, that is, via B 11 and B 22 . By a version Proposition 3 in Evans and Honkapohja (2003b), we …nd that for all parameter values the REE of the two-country world economy under world-wide adherence to open economy expectations-based optimal rules is stable under least squares learning by private agents. So, we …nd that the EH (2003b) result that incorporation of observed private sector expectations into the policymaker's optimal rule can overcome expectational stability problems carries over to the two-country environment of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) if the relevant rules are modi…ed to take due recognition of open economy e¤ects.
Other implementations of (23) are known to have poor properties with respect to learnability and determinacy, however, and we now turn to this case.
An open economy fundamentals-based optimal rule
A fundamentals-based policy rule implementing (23) generates a di¤erent reduced form. To obtain an optimal interest rate rule under rational expectations conjecture a solution of the form
for the domestic economy, with an analogous conjectured solution for the foreign economy. The MSV solution has
where 0;0 ; ;0 ; y;0 ; u;0 are given by (25) through (28) respectively. The policy feedback rule is then
with 0 = 0;0 + ;0 a 2 + y;0 a 1 and u = ;0 d 2 + y;0 d 1 + u;0 : This is sometimes called the fundamentals form of the RE-optimal policy rule. It is known that this interest rate rule is associated with indeterminacy in the closed economy case. 18 The world economy can be written as
with B block diagonal,
18 See for instance Woodford (1999 Woodford ( , 2003 and Svensson and Woodford (2003) .
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Determinacy requires ja 0 j < 1 and
the characteristic equation for B 11 and B 22 ; respectively. For the domestic economy (and analogously for the foreign economy),
o and a 0 = : The condition ja 1 j < 1 + a 0 is never met under maintained assumptions and so worldwide equilibrium is indeterminate, as in the domestic economy case discussed by Evans and Honkapohja (2003) . The MSV solution will also be unstable in the learning dynamics. We conclude that the method of implementing (23) will matter in the open economy case just as it does in the closed economy.
Cooperative discretionary policy 4.3.1 Overview
As we have seen, block diagonality breaks down if policymakers put weight on international variables in their policy rules, or, in a targeting approach, in their objective function.
That is exactly what happens should policymakers in each country attempt to pursue the gains to cooperation which normally exist in this model. We now turn to this issue. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) study cooperation in the context of their New Keynesian model and are thus part of what Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2004) call second generation models of policy coordination. Canzoneri, et al., state that the gains from coordination are larger in second generation models than in …rst generation models. 19 Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) show in their Proposition 3 that gains to international policy cooperation will accrue to both countries when > 1 and each country follows a rule dictated by the solution to a joint optimization problem. We now follow Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and discuss the prospects for determinacy and learnability if each country attempts to pursue the gains from cooperation.
The policy problem
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) de…ne cooperation to mean that the two central banks in the model agree to maximize a weighted average of the utility of the home and foreign households under discretion. The weights are naturally and 1 : Both governments refrain from creating a surprise appreciation, and hand out employment subsidies that just o¤set the monopolistic competition distortion. The monetary authorities jointly maximize an approximation to weighted household utility given by The …rst order conditions for this problem can then be written in terms of standard output gaps as 
One implementation
Combining these conditions with (1) and (3) gives optimal cooperative policy rules where
The dynamic system, determinacy, and learnability The world economy can be written as
where the key matrix B is
and 
1) :
25 Determinacy properties will again depend on the eigenvalues of the matrix B: The lack of block diagonality indicates that policy in each country will in ‡uence determinacy properties. The four eigenvalues of B are given by 2 :
These eigenvalues are independent of , the degree of openness. This is because the two economies are following a cooperative policy which takes the size of each economy into account. Determinacy does not always hold.
In particular,
Unless the serial correlation in the shock is su¢ ciently large, this cooperative policy will generate indeterminacy. 21 We use the baseline calibration with the addition of = 7:88 implying a markup of about 15 percent, and we report results for values of . The cuto¤ value for the serial correlation parameter is c 0:165: 22 Values less than this will create indeterminacy given the baseline calibration. Should the shock process become something more like white noise, optimal policy cooperation implemented in this way will be associated with indeterminacy.
For determinate cases, we veri…ed numerically at baseline parameter values that expectational stability holds. One might wonder if full cooperation is really a good positive model for world monetary policy. In the international policy arena, we seem to observe a variety of strategies in play. So far in the paper we have only considered certain types of symmetry in policy, but there are also interesting asymmetric situations. We now turn to one of these. In this section we suppose the home country targets its nominal exchange rate e vis-a-vis the foreign country. We assume the foreign economy sets its monetary policy based on its own domestic considerations. The home country gives up its domestic monetary autonomy in return for "importing monetary stability"from the foreign, anchor country. This is a leading example of an asymmetric exchange rate regime, as only the anchor country's variables matter for its interest rate (depending on the nature of the policy adopted there), and the home country simply sets its interest rate to ensure it realizes a …xed exchange rate. The home country in setting policy takes foreign monetary conditions into account, but the foreign country need not incorporate the home country's conditions in its own monetary policy stance. This arrangement is similar to the regimes adopted by some European countries prior to economic and monetary union and to the present peg of the Chinese renminbi to the U.S. dollar.
The policy problem
The home country minimizes
The minimization is subject tõ For ease of exposition we normalize the initial levels of the nominal exchange rate and terms of trade at zero (e t 1 = s t 1 = 0), so that
In what follows we normalize the exchange rate target at zero (e T = 0). From (30) the …rst-order condition then becomes e t = 0, which combined with (33) implies
The intuition behind (34) is the following. The nominal exchange rate obeys CPI-based purchasing power parity and, after appropriate normalization, is given by e t = t ? t + s t . In order to prevent ‡uctuations in e t , the home central bank should manipulate the terms of trade s t , which it can a¤ect via the domestic output gap, in such a way as to o¤set the GDP de ‡ator-based in ‡ation di¤erential. Thus we have (34) .
Since the terms of trade can be a¤ected by the domestic output gap, which in turn is a¤ected by the home nominal interest rate, the home central bank should try to achieve a level of the home output gap given bỹ
Equation (35) is obtained by substituting the expression for the terms of trade into the …rst-order condition and rearranging.
The policy rule
Substituting (32) into (35), we obtain the home country's optimal monetary policy rule in terms of its indirect controlỹ t
The home interest rate reaction function can be obtained by combining (36) with ( 
The rule (37) describes the optimal home monetary reaction function that implements its monetary policy of pegging the exchange rate to the foreign anchor country. 23 We substitute the home country's policy rule (37) into (31) . This implies
Here the dependence of home's economic outcomes on the foreign macroeconomy is evident from the presence of the terms ? t andỹ ? t .
The dynamic system, determinacy, and learnability
Whether or not a …xed exchange rate regime is compatible with determinacy of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium depends on how the foreign, anchor country implements monetary policy, and on any international spillover e¤ects on the home country. We make the assumption that the foreign, anchor country is inward-looking, and concerned only about reacting to developments in its own economy. We proceed with the most straightforward assumption, namely that the foreign in ‡ation country follows a simple Taylor-type policy rule. This allows us to easily study cases where the foreign, anchor monetary authorities are pursuing policies either consistent or inconsistent with determinacy and learnability of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium.
The world economy can again be written in standard form. The matrix B is given by
where B 22 is the matrix associated with a simple Taylor rule in use in the foreign country. The eigenvalues there will depend on whether the foreign country is following the open economy version of the Taylor principle or not, as discussed earlier in the paper. The eigenvalues of B 11 will also have to be less than unity for determinacy. This matrix is given by 
:
The eigenvalues are zero and
We conclude that determinacy holds under maintained assumptions provided the foreign, anchor monetary authorities are following the Taylor principle. Learnability holds under the same conditions. One may be able to imagine scenarios under which this result would break down, if the foreign, anchor economy had some other policy. But this result suggests there need not be anything intrinsically unstable in the use of an exchange rate peg.
Conclusion
We have developed results on determinacy and expectational stability for a simple open economy New Keynesian model due to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) . We used this model with an eye toward comparing the open economy …ndings to known results for closed economies under similar assumptions.
We have shown that even for simple Taylor-type policy rules, open economy considerations will have quantitative e¤ects on determinacy and learnability conditions. Closed economy analyses tend to understate the degree of aggressiveness the policymaker must adopt to avoid indeterminacy and expectational instability. Quantitative di¤erences of this type are alluded to by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and are in accord with the …ndings of Llosa and Tuesta (2005) .
When central banks are inward-looking-reacting to domestic variables in their policy rules-and when exchange rates are ‡oating, our results indicate that determinacy and learnability conditions for worldwide equilibrium must be met country by country. This is true whether we are considering inward-looking instrument rules or targeting rules which are implied by non-cooperative policy objectives. Optimal policy will require an implementation, but the natural implementations suggested in the closed economy literature imply the separability of determinacy and learnability conditions across economies. We interpret this …nding as follows. If one country out of many adopts an instrument rule that is inconsistent with determinacy and learnability, or one country out of many adopts an implementation of an optimal policy which is inconsistent with determinacy and learnability, then worldwide equilibrium will be indeterminate and expectationally unstable. The remaining countries, even if they attempt to be very aggressive in promoting determinacy and learnability, will not have an impact on this facet of the world equilibrium. This might be viewed as an undesirable aspect of inward-looking policies, even if they are judged 'optimal'on other grounds.
When monetary authorities are actively responding to international variables, our results indicate that determinacy and learnability conditions for worldwide equilibrium are met by something akin to an average of world monetary policy. This also occurs for targeting rules where monetary authorities are attempting to pursue cooperative policies to achieve the available gains. Optimal cooperative policy will also require an implementation, and the baseline implementation from the literature may not be consistent with determinacy and learnability. Still, inclusion of reactions to international variables allows the monetary authorities from a su¢ ciently large economy to mitigate the threats of indeterminacy and expectational instability posed by a partner country that is pursuing a poor policy, either through an ad hoc policy or through an inadvertently bad implementation of an optimal policy. The ability to in ‡uence these conditions may be viewed as a desirable aspect of monetary policy in an open economy context.
